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India and Australia have the potential to become important strategic partners in Asia as part 
of a coalition that could help manage the changing balance of power in the region.  But 
while India and Australia share many strategic interests, both countries still have a lot to 
learn about how to get along with each other. Some might even see them as the odd couple 
of the Indo-Pacific.  This paper looks at recent developments in the relationship in the areas 
of security, politics and economics, and the prospects for a closer partnership under the 
new Modi government.   
 
Congruent Strategic Interests 
 
Many analysts see the strategic interests of Australia and India as ‘essentially congruent’1 
and there certainly seems to be considerable scope to develop closer economic, political 
and security relations.    But a strategic partnership between will not necessarily come easy 
– it will require a sustained political commitment from both sides to overcome longstanding 
differences in perspectives. 
 
For much of their history as independent states, the relationship between Australia and 
India has been cordial but somewhat distant.  During the Cold War and after, the 
relationship was characterised by periods of indifference interspersed with occasional 
political irritations.  Australia and India share a language, British-style institutions and a 
democratic tradition, all of which could underpin a shared strategic outlook.  But in practice 
the colonial link often served to divide just as much as it has united them.2   
 
India’s economic growth and the changing balance of power in Asia have now created a new 
dynamic in the relationship.  Australia and India’s strategic interests are now aligned as 
never before.  These include shared concerns about the role of China, the management of 
maritime security across the Indo-Pacific and the security and stability of our region 
generally. In 2009, Prime Minister Rudd told an audience in New Delhi that India and 
  
Australia were ‘natural partners’ and should become ‘strategic partners’.3 That may not 
have yet been achieved in substance, but there is certainly a new-found openness on both 
sides to engage and move beyond the ideological differences of the past.  The process of 
serious relationship building is really only just beginning:  over the last decade or so the two 
sides have engaged as never before, but cooperation now needs to move into a more 
concrete phase.  The election of the new Modi government may provide an opportunity to 
move the relationship to a new level.  
 
A new economic partnership   
 
The economic relationship between Australia and India has long been quite weak, which has 
contributed to an overall lack of political alignment over the last 65 years.  Australia’s 
biggest economic partners are in northeast Asia, where it feeds resources and energy to the 
economies of China, Japan and South Korea, and this in turn has led to large-scale bilateral 
investments.  In contrast India’s economy, which was largely closed to external trade and 
investment for many decades, is still in the process of opening up, and this has restricted 
the opportunities for economic engagement.   
 
Assuming that India’s economy will be opened up further under a Modi government, it is 
likely that in coming years India will become one of Australia’s largest customers for 
resources and energy.  The two economies can be seen as complementary in both economic 
and strategic terms.  From Australia’s standpoint India represents a huge and growing 
export market and an opportunity to provide greater balance Australia’s economic 
relationship with China.  For India, Australia represents a politically stable and reliable 
source of energy and resources to help fuel its economic growth, as well an important new 
market for exports.  There are considerable opportunities to further develop two-way trade 
and a far stronger investment relationship 
 
There has been significant growth in trade over the last decade and in 2012-13, bilateral 
merchandise and services trade stood at A$16.6 billion (although the value of exports to 
India had dropped considerably over the previous year). Australian exports are 
  
concentrated in coal, gold, copper and education services and overall India is now 
Australia’s fourth largest export customer after China, Japan and South Korea.  But the 
balance of trade is heavily in favour of Australia, which could be a potential source of 
tension.   
 
The investment relationship remains relatively undeveloped and the lack of substantial 
investment links could makes the economic relationship potentially fragile.  Australian 
resource companies, for example, which are among the largest and most technologically 
advanced in the world, are very keen to participate in the Indian resource sector, but have 
found themselves largely locked out by restrictive Indian investment rules.  There is growing 
among some Indian companies in resource-based investments in Australia as part of vertical 
integration strategies.  This includes some very large acquisitions in Queensland’s Galilee 
coal basin, which could become Australia’s largest coal project. However, the entire project 
is looking increasingly uneconomic and seems unlikely to proceed in the near term if at all.   
 
A Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) between India and Australia has 
been under negotiation for some time.  With the recent finalisation by Australia of free 
trade agreements with Japan, South Korea and China, the Abbott government has turned its 
attention to the Australia-India CECA and hopes to make significant progress this year.   The 
potential gains are huge.  According to a 2008 feasibility study, the CECA, if it had been 
adopted then, would yield a gain to Australia of A$43 billion over the period 2010-20 (in 
2008 net present value terms) and a gain to India’s real GDP of A$46 billion.4  The 
finalisation of the India-Australia CECA would therefore represent big step forward in 
creating the conditions for much closer economic and political relations. 
 
A new political and security partnership  
 
The political and security relationship has also developed considerably over the last decade - 
although for reasons somewhat apart from the economic relationship.   This broadly reflects 
a convergence of strategic perspectives, particularly as a rising India looks to assume greater 
responsibilities across the Indo-Pacific and as many states in the region, India and Australia 
  
included, have become increasingly concerned about China’s strategic ambitions.  The 2006 
US-India nuclear deal also removed some of the ideological roadblocks that long inhibited a 
closer political engagement between Delhi and Canberra.   
 
Over the last decade, the security engagement between the two countries has gained 
considerable momentum. Several bilateral agreements on security-related matters have 
been signed, including a 2003 agreement on terrorism, a 2006 memorandum of 
understanding on defence cooperation, a 2007 defence information sharing arrangement, 
and agreements on intelligence dialogue, extradition, and terrorism in 2008.    In November 
2009, Australia and India announced a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, intended 
to set out shared strategic perspectives and create a framework for the further 
development of bilateral security cooperation.  The Security Declaration is a non-binding 
declaration of principles and understandings, which establishes a bilateral framework for 
further cooperation in security matters.5 The Declaration was a notable step in establishing 
a framework to further develop the security relationship, including the formalisation of 
regular consultations and dialogues between foreign ministers, senior military and 
diplomatic representatives, and joint working groups on maritime security operations and 
counter-terrorism and immigration.   Australia has signed similar Declarations with Japan 
and South Korea and India has a similar Declaration with Japan – which reflects a growing 
web of security relationships among middle powers of the Indo-Pacific. 
 
These formal agreements have underpinned greater engagement between India and 
Australia on security-related matters over the last 5-10 years. Bilateral defence and security 
dialogues currently include: 
 
 Meetings of Australian and Indian Foreign Ministers: Held annually since 2001 pursuant 
to the India-Australia Foreign Ministers' Framework Dialogue (FMFD). 
 Meetings of Defence Ministers: These have been held at relatively regular intervals, but 
not annually. The meetings have mostly been held in India, but in June 2013 Indian 
Defence Minister A. K. Antony visited Australia for the first time. 
  
 Annual Defence Policy Talks: These talks have been held since 2010 at level of the 
Additional Secretary (India) and Defence Secretary – Strategy (Australia). 
 Regular visits of Service Chiefs: Australian and Indian Service Chiefs meet their 
counterparts around once a year. 
 Australia-India Maritime Security Operations Working Group (established in 2006). 
 Regular staff talks between senior officers of the navies (held annually), air forces (which 
was supposed to be annual, but recently moved to a biennial basis) and armies (held 
biennially). 
 A 1.5 Track Strategic Roundtable (held since 2001) and a 1.5 Track Defence Strategic 
Dialogue (held since 2012), hosted by Australian and Indian think tanks. 
 
These dialogues have brought India and Australia into sustained contact at political, 
bureaucratic and military levels as never before.  Many would see these dialogues as an 
important step in itself, although from an Australian perspective they still often appear to 
lack real substance or follow-through on the Indian side.  This probably reflects general 
constraints in the Indian political and bureaucratic processes more than anything specifically 
to do with Australia.  It seems that some in the Indian bureaucracy are still not fully 
comfortable with the idea of defence cooperation with other countries.  As a result, the 
Indian services, particularly the navy, are frequently frustrated by bureaucratic roadblocks 
from developing closer relationships with their counterparts, including with Australia. 
 
But these developments, as important as they are, should also be viewed against the missed 
opportunities and challenges over the last decade. In the security dimension, one important 
missed opportunity for a broader security engagement between India and Australia was the 
so-called “Quadrilateral” initiative in 2007. This involved a proposal by Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe for a formal security dialogue among Japan, the U.S., India, and 
Australia.  The initiative sparked a strongly negative reaction from Beijing, which claimed it 
marked “the formation of a small NATO to resist China”6 and each of the putative partners 
(including Japan) became increasingly hesitant about it.  But it was Australia, under Prime 
Minister Rudd, that first publicly backed away from the proposal.  Canberra was concerned 
about China’s reaction to the proposal, but it was also concerned that the arrangement 
  
might effectively replace the Trilateral Security Dialogue among the U.S. Japan, and 
Australia, which Australia regarded as a key forum for coordination among the Pacific allies.    
 
For several years, nuclear issues were also a considerable irritant, slowing the development 
of the relationship. Although Australia supported the approval of the U.S.-India nuclear deal 
by the Nuclear Supplier’s Group in August 2008, it continued to refuse to supply uranium to 
India for several years because it was outside the international non-proliferation system. It 
was feared that making a special exception for India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, might seriously undermine international non-proliferation norms. 
While India did not need Australian uranium, having secured supplies elsewhere,  New Delhi 
saw this prohibition as indicating a lack of commitment to the relationship and a refusal to 
acknowledge India’s great power status.  But a change in Australia’s uranium policy in 2011, 
and the impending finalisation of uranium supply arrangements, has largely removed this 
impediment to the relationship. 
 
Overall, while the relationship appears to have a lot of potential, concrete developments in 
the relationship – particularly in the security dimension – are occurring very slowly.  Many 
observers do not consider that bilateral dialogues yet have a great deal of substance and, 
importantly, engagement at an operational level remains thin.      
 
Cooperation in international forums 
 
A convergence in strategic perspectives has also led to nascent political and diplomatic 
cooperation between Australia and India on the international stage.  Over the last couple of 
years the two have been increasingly working together towards the development of 
multilateral economic, political and security institutions in Asia that are ‘balanced’ (i.e. not 
unduly dominated by China).   This has included increasing cooperation between them in 
groupings such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
 
In the Indian Ocean region, India and Australia have been cooperating in further developing 
the activities of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), a biennial meeting of naval 
  
chiefs of Indian Ocean states.  They have also been making considerable efforts to give fresh 
life to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA - formerly called IOR-ARC), including through 
adding maritime security issues to that organisation’s brief.  While there will always be 
significant limitations on the effectiveness of IORA, largely due to the extreme diversity of 
its members, both India and Australia recognize the importance of developing an effective 
regional organization in which they and other key states play an active role. 
 
Many believe that there is considerable scope for more concrete security cooperation 
between India and Australia in the maritime realm, and organisations such as IORA and 
IONS could be a key focus for this.  This includes cooperation in areas such as maritime 
policing (piracy and maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, people trafficking etc) and 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR), anti-terrorism, local capacity building and in 
maritime domain awareness.  Southeast Asia would be a natural focus for cooperation given 
their common interests in that region, but there is also the potential for cooperation 
elsewhere, for example, among the Indian Ocean islands.  
 
There may also be scope for India-Australia cooperation at a global level, including on issues 
such as nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and in various weapons non-
proliferation regimes.  These include the so-called Australia Group (a grouping of some 41 
states and international organisations that collaborate to prevent the abuse of dual-use 
technology and materials for chemical and biological weapons programmes). Other 
important export control regimes aimed at non-proliferation include the Nuclear Supplier 
Group (a grouping of some 47 states that supply nuclear materials and technology), the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (a grouping of 34 states to prevent the proliferation of 
missile technologies with a range above 400 kilometres) and the Wassenaar Arrangement 
(an informal arrangement among 41 participating states aimed at non-proliferation of 
conventional arms and dual use goods).   Australia is chair of the Australia Group and an 
active member of the other regimes. India is currently not a member of any of these 
groupings, which represents a significant anomaly in the international arms control system.  
 
  
In 2010, President Barack Obama signalled U.S. support for bringing India into the various 
export control regimes. Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute argues that Australia’s role in the 
Australia Group, in particular, can give it some leverage to assist India in this respect. The 
Australia Group may be a logical place to begin India’s formal entry into the global export 
control network, because it is not connected to any residual sensitivities about nuclear 
issues. 7  Given India’s massive chemical industry and the growing biotechnology sector, the 
absence of India from the export control regime is unsustainable.  
 
The participation by India in such groups may also require changes in New Delhi’s attitudes 
towards such regimes. India has long opposed the nuclear non-proliferation system, which it 
argued unfairly discriminated against it. India also previously opposed other export control 
regimes based on the argument that they were part of a western policy of denying 
technology to India and other developing countries, however that perspective is changing 
over time.   
 
People to people ties and public opinion 
 
People-to-people ties between Australia and India have historically been quite weak.  This 
has not been helped by the fact that the Indian community in Australia is relatively small 
compared with other immigrant communities including from China and other countries in 
East Asia. But this is changing, driven among other things by a huge increase in young 
Indians studying in Australia, and in 2011-12 India became the largest single source of 
immigration to Australia. Australia will no doubt feel the growing political and economic 
influence of its Indian community in coming years.   
 
Public opinion is also becoming an increasingly important factor in the relationship. In 2009, 
muggings of several Indian students in Melbourne led to hostile reports in the Indian media, 
which caused decision-makers in Delhi to slow down further developments in relations.    
Despite these controversies, the Indian public now appears to see Australia in favourable 
terms and as an important potential partner for India. According to the Australian Lowy 
Institute’s 2013 poll of Indian public opinion on foreign policy issues,8 when Indian 
  
respondents were asked to rate the warmth of their feelings to various countries on a 1-100 
scale, Australia was rated fourth at 56, ranking behind only the U.S. (62), Singapore (58) and 
Japan (57), but well ahead of other Asian or African states.   When Indians were asked what 
countries India should be more like, Australia was rated second (at 60% of respondents) 
only after the U.S. (78%). A slightly lower level of respondents (56%) thought that Australia 
would be a good partner for India in the Indian Ocean.   These findings seem to demonstrate 
that there is popular support for closer relations with Australia. 
 
While political and other controversies between India and Australia should be expected to 
arise in the future, the increase in people-to-people ties between India and Australia bode 
well for a more mature and resilient relationship between the two countries. 
 
Challenges in developing the relationship 
 
But despite these developments and opportunities, it must be recognized that the 
relationship still presents considerable challenges.   
 
One structural issue is the inherent difficulty in building a productive relationship between 
an emerging power with great power aspirations such as India and an active middle power 
such as Australia.  Australia is neither a major power nor a small state.  In the last decade or 
so, India has made significant progress in developing closer security relationships with major 
powers such as the United States and Japan and it has also developed security partnerships 
with small states such as Singapore, Mauritius and Maldives.9  It has relatively less success in 
developing security and defence relationships with middle powers, especially an activist 
middle power such as Australia.   
 
As yet, there is little understanding that each is a crucial element in the other’s security.  
Some in New Delhi still do not see Australia as not an ‘independent’ strategic actor due to 
its alliance with the United States.  Why deal with Canberra when one can deal with 
Washington?  This view may be on the decline, but there is still little sense that India should 
take Australia’s opinions into consideration, particularly when making judgments about 
  
China or the Indian Ocean.  Australia still needs to make the case that it should be seen as 
an indispensible partner to India.   
 
Australia and India also have quite different traditions and instincts about security 
collaboration which may inhibit security cooperation.  In contrast to Australia’s instincts to 
join international coalitions, India’s instinct is to oppose multilateral security cooperation 
except under the clear banner of the United Nations.  Cooperation, particularly operational 
cooperation, carries with it an ideological taint that India’s strategic autonomy will be 
undermined.    
 
Another major factor is China.  While China is a key factor bringing Australia and India 
together, both have also been cautious about allowing the relationship to be perceived as 
anything that might resemble anti-China coalition.  There are also some differences in 
perspective.  Canberra tends to be more open than Delhi to the idea of facilitating a role for 
China as a legitimate stakeholder in Indian Ocean security.  While Australia is concerned 
about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, Australian analysts have tended to treat 
Indian claims about the nature and extent of Chinese involvement in the Indian Ocean 
region with a degree of skepticism.  Whereas some in India may see strategic benefit in 
having the capability to control China’s sea lanes of communication, Australia arguably has a 
greater interest in creating opportunities to facilitate China’s role as a responsible 
stakeholder in the Indian Ocean.  
 
Where does all this leave prospects for greater strategic cooperation?  Although there are 
many shared interests and opportunities, a closer relationship will require sustained political 
will in both Canberra and New Delhi to overcome differences in their political and strategic 
cultures and develop a better understanding of each other’s perspectives.  For India, in 
some ways, Australia represents a difficult case. Australia’s close relationship with the 
United States still creates political unease among some in New Delhi.  On the other hand, 
Australia, could be a useful partner for India in leveraging its reach.  In the longer term, New 
Delhi may find that a good working relationship with Australia may ease the way for India’s 
broader strategic aspirations.  
  
 
The new Modi government 
 
The election of Narendra Modi as India’s Prime Minister could have significant 
consequences for the relationship.   It is widely expected that Modi’s pro-business views will 
help revive India’s economy, which would add vigour to the India-Australia’s economic 
partnership.  Modi built much of his reputation for economic development based on trade 
and investment, and this is likely to be central to Modi’s plans to revive India’s economy.  
This may be good news for the prospects for the Australia-India CECA.     
 
Modi has not expressed any public opinions about India’s relationship with Australia, but 
the indications are that new BJP government is likely to be more realist in orientation and 
less institutionally bound to India’s Nehruvian rhetoric of non-alignment as compared with 
its predecessor.  This may create opportunities for Australia to press for more concrete 
cooperation, particularly in maritime security. 
 
One BJP policy that could have more direct impact on the bilateral relationship is the idea of 
India crafting a ‘web of alliances’ to boost its international weight.  It is not yet clear what 
this may mean in practice, but it does stand in contrast with the Congress party’s rhetorical 
attachment to non-alignment.  India is now in the process of crafting an alliance network in 
all but name with Indian Ocean states such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius 
and is also paying much greater attention to its defence relationships with Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.    
 
India must now pay much more attention to its security relationships with key middle 
powers of the Indo-Pacific – and in practical terms Australia should be a prime candidate 
here.  Commentators such as C.Raja Mohan have called for India to be part of a “middle 
power coalition” across the Indo-Pacific, which would have a relationship with Australia at 
its core, but also include partners such as Japan and Indonesia.10 Such a strategy could be an 
attractive way for India to leverage its regional influence.  A Modi government is likely to 
have greater ideological freedom that the previous government to develop closer security 
  
relationships with Australia and other middle powers.  But it is not clear yet whether the 
Modi government will have sufficient reason to move beyond traditional thinking and 
develop comprehensive strategic partnerships with Australia and others.    
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